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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THEO W. PLESCIA, d. b. a. 
WESTERN AUTO PARTS COMPANY, 
Respondent, 
Case No. 7775 
vs. 
LOUIS E. HUMPHRIES, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the lst day of July, 1948, appellant executed 
and delivered to respondent ll promissory notes, 10 of said 
notes being in form demand notes in the sum of $100.00 each, 
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the first being dated August l, 1948, and the rest being dated 
the 1st day of the next succeeding 9 months respectively. 
The interest clause on each of said notes was left blank (R. 18). 
The lith note was delivered in blank its purpose being to 
take care of the interest on the other ten notes (R. 16, 31). 
Appellant was purchasing a purported Austin dealership 
for Salt Lake City from one Art Flowers, and the notes re-
presented part of the consideration for said dealership, the 
said Flowers being in debt to respondent in the sum of 
$1,000.00 (R. 15, 36, 37), which debt appellant assumed. 
No mention was made whether Flowers was released· from 
his obligation (R. 41, 50). 
After paying three of said notes appellant discovered that 
the said Flowers had no right or authority to grant him an 
Austin dealership (R. 38) so he refused to pay any of the 
remaining notes because of the failure of the consideration for 
their execution. 
Respondent then brought this action to collect the remain-
ing 7 unpaid notes. 
The notes set forth in the respondent's complaint, and 
the notes themselves produced at the trial of the case, showed 
that they had been altered, and respondent testified that he had 
altered the notes in the following particulars: ( 1) he had 
written the date when the notes were delivered to him on the 
top of each note ( R. 17, 28) ; ( 2) he had filled in the interest 
clause on each note to read "Six percent per annum and ten 
percent after due date" (R. 18, 26-27); and (3) he had 
written a due date on each note (R. 19, 26-27, 29). Res-
pondent further testified that these alterations were made 
without the assent of the appellant (R. 19-20). Appellant 
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also testified that he never authorized any of the alterations 
(R. 48). 
The court made no finding on the question of these al-
terations and gave judgment to respondent on the 7 notes. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in its failure to find that the notes had been 
materially altered by respondent without the assent of the 
appellant. 
2. The decision of the court is against law. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO FIND THAT 
THE NOTES HAD BEEN MATERIALLY ALTERED BY 
RESPONDENT WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE APPEL-
LANT. 
Appellant relies on the following statute: 
Section 61-l-127~ UCA 1943. What Constitutes a Mater-
ial Alteration. 
Any alteration, which changes: 
(1) The date; 
(2) The sum payable, either for principal or interest; 
(3) The time or place of payment; 
Or any other change or addition which alters the effect 
of the instrument in any respect;-
Is a material alteration. 
By respondent's own testimony it is determined that re-
spondent filled in the interest clauses on each note to read 
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"Six per cent per annum and ten per cent after due date," 
when it was understood and agreed upon between appellant 
(the maker) and respondent (the payee) that said notes would 
not bear interest in and of themselves, but that the interest 
would be taken care of in a separate note. Quoting from 
American Juris prudence, Alteration of Instruments, Sec. 66: 
"It is a well established rule that any alteration in an 
instrument for the payment of money, of a clause relating to 
interest, is a material change discharging from liability on 
the instrument any parties thereto who did not consent to 
the alteration, except in cases where the holder may be en-
titled to protection as a bona fide holder for value. This is 
true in the case of the addition of an interest clause to an 
instrument which would not otherwise bear interest. . . . And 
if a note with interest clause blank is not regarded as an in-
terest bearing note, the insertion of a rate of interest, even 
though the legal rate, vitiates the note, as it changes it from a 
non-interest bearing note to one bearing interest." 
And in the leading Utah case on this point, Idaho State 
Bank of Twin Falls, vs. Hooper Sugar Company, 75 Utah 24, 
276 Pac 659, 68 A. L. R. 969, it was held that a change in 
the interest rate per annum from 6 to 7 percent, even though 
done in conformity with the agreement between the. parties 
thereto, was a material alteration, and that such a material al-
teration constituted a defense to an action on the instrument. 
Respondent further testified that he filled in a due date on 
each note. When the notes were delivered to him they were 
in form demand notes, yet, without authority from appellant, 
respondent added a due date thus changing the character of 
the notes from demand notes to notes due on a certain date. 
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It is submitted that these alterations constituted additions 
to the notes which altered the effect of the instruments in im-
portant respects and were thus material alterations. 
Point 2. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS AGAINST LAW. 
Section 61-1-126, UCA 1943, Alteration of Instrument; 
Effect of, reads as follows: 
"Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered with-
out the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, ex-
cept as against a party who has himself made, authorized or 
assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers. . . . " 
American Juris prudence, Alteration of Instruments 35, 
Recovery on Altered Instrument, contains a good discussion 
of this particular point raised by the foregoing statute: 
"It is well established as a general rule that the unauthorized 
material alteration of a written instrument by a party thereto, 
or the holder thereof, so vitiates the instrument that no re-
covery may thereafter be had upon it as altered, by the person 
responsible for the alteration, or those claiming under him, even 
in accordance with its original tenor. The basis of the doctrine 
is that any material alteration destroys the identity of the 
contract~ and, therefore, if a party to the contract who has 
not consented to its alteration were to be held bound by it, 
it woul,l be, in effect, imposing upon him against his will a 
new contract to whose terms he never agreed. He is not 
bound l,y the new contract, not because it may be less advan-
tageous to him than the original agreement, but because it is 
a contract which he has never made; and the one that he did 
make is canceled by the change." 
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This court has spoken in conformity with this discussion in 
'two leading cases; Garner vs. Thomas, 94 Utah 291, 75 Pac 
(2) 168, and in Idaho State Bank of ·Twin Falls vs. Hooper 
Sugar (o., 7 4 Utah 24, 276 P 659, 68 ALR 969, quoted 
under Point l. In the former the Utah State Supreme Court, 
in ruling on a case involving an alteration of the interest 
rate on a note from 7% to 8%, said: 
"That a material alteration in a note voids it in the hands 
of the m1e who makes the change as to all parties then liable 
thereon who do not consent thereto, is too well established to 
require argument." 
And in the latter case, the Court said that a material altera-
~tion constituted a defense to an action on the instrument. 
The respondent testified that the changes and additions to 
.the notes made by him were done without authority from the 
rappeHant. It follows that if the alterations were material, as 
appellant contends, the notes were avoided by reason of Sec-
tion 61-1-126, UCA 1943. 
CONCLUSION 
The District court having erred in its failure to find that 
the notes had been materially altered by respondent without 
the assent of the appellant, and its decision being against 
law, the judgment of the District Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert L. Backman, 
of Backman, Backman & Clark 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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